The Untouchables: When Exposing Corruption Is Not Enough.
Over R1.2 billion. That is what South African taxpayers have spent on just four major commissions of inquiry over the past decade. The money funded years of testimony, thousands of pages of evidence, and hundreds of recommendations. Yet when you ask how many people have been prosecuted, the number drops to a trickle.
The pattern repeats itself. A scandal breaks. Public outrage builds. The government announces a commission of inquiry. Months turn into years. The commission delivers its findings. Then silence.
This is the commission cycle that South Africa cannot seem to break.
The Billion Rand Question
The Zondo Commission into State Capture stands as the most expensive judicial inquiry in South Africa’s democratic history. It cost R1 billion over four years. The commission heard from 300 witnesses across 400 days of public hearings. It produced 75,099 pages of transcribed testimony and implicated 1,438 individuals and entities.
The evidence was damning. Former Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo documented how a small network of individuals captured state institutions for personal gain. The commission revealed how billions of rand were siphoned from state-owned enterprises. It named names. It followed the money. It made specific recommendations for criminal prosecution.
Three years after the final report was submitted in June 2022, how many prosecutions have followed?
As of July 2025, 51 individuals and 27 entities face criminal charges. That represents just over 5% of those implicated. The government points to R14 billion in frozen assets and R5.4 billion recovered as evidence of progress. But freezing money is not the same as sending corrupt officials to jail.
The gap between findings and prosecutions raises uncomfortable questions. If 1,438 people were implicated by evidence, why are only 78 facing charges? What happened to the other 1,360 cases? Were the commission’s findings credible or were they not?
When Commissions Work
Not all commissions fail to produce results. The Nugent Commission into SARS stands as the exception.
Established in May 2018, the commission cost just R8.8 million. It investigated how former SARS Commissioner Tom Moyane had systematically dismantled one of Africa’s most effective tax collection agencies. The commission found that Moyane installed surveillance cameras to monitor staff, fragmented successful units, and awarded questionable contracts to consulting firm Bain & Company.
The results came quickly. President Cyril Ramaphosa fired Moyane in November 2018 before the final report was even released. Edward Kieswetter was appointed as the new commissioner. SARS began rebuilding its capacity. Bain & Company paid back R217 million in fees.
The Nugent Commission succeeded because it had a narrow focus, completed its work quickly, and produced findings that were acted upon immediately. The contrast with other commissions could not be starker.
The R140 Million Whitewash
The Seriti Commission into the Arms Deal ran from 2011 to 2016. It cost taxpayers between R137 million and R140 million. Its mandate was to investigate allegations of fraud, corruption, and impropriety in South Africa’s strategic defence procurement package from 1999.
The deal had seen the government purchase R30 billion worth of military equipment. Multiple credible allegations of corruption had emerged over the years. Two people had already been convicted in relation to the deal: Tony Yengeni for fraud and Schabir Shaik for corruption. Foreign arms companies had paid millions in fines to their home countries for irregularities related to the deal.
Yet Judge Willie Seriti concluded there was not one iota of corruption.
The commission heard testimony from 54 witnesses. Critics noted that witnesses implicated in corruption were rarely cross-examined while those presenting evidence of wrongdoing faced aggressive questioning. Key witnesses were never called. Documentary evidence was ignored. Former President Jacob Zuma, though implicated, never took the stand.
In August 2019, the North Gauteng High Court set aside the commission’s findings. Judge Dunstan Mlambo ruled that the commission failed to inquire fully into the matters it was required to investigate. He said the questions posed to witnesses were hardly those of an evidence leader seeking to determine the truth.
Three years of work. R140 million spent. Findings overturned. Zero prosecutions beyond those that preceded the commission.
The PIC: Some Action, Limited Accountability
The Mpati Commission investigated impropriety at the Public Investment Corporation, which manages over R2 trillion on behalf of public sector workers. The commission cost R54.5 million and ran from 2018 to 2020.
The findings revealed multiple irregularities. The commission found that the PIC had sound policies and procedures but these were often deliberately bypassed or manipulated. It documented questionable investments including R4.3 billion in AYO Technology Solutions, R1 billion in a Mozambican palm oil plant, and R9.4 billion in Steinhoff International Holdings.
Some consequences followed. CEO Dan Matjila resigned in November 2018. Two executives were fired over the AYO investment. The head of risk management was dismissed for poor performance. The executive head for legal counsel resigned.
But resignations are not prosecutions. The commission recommended that certain individuals be investigated further and potentially face criminal charges. Years later, those prosecutions have not materialized. The people who approved billions in questionable investments walked away with their reputations damaged but their freedom intact.
The Newest Addition: Madlanga
In July 2025, President Ramaphosa established the Madlanga Commission to investigate allegations of criminal infiltration in the justice system itself. The commission, chaired by retired Constitutional Court Justice Mbuyiseli Madlanga, followed explosive claims by KwaZulu-Natal Police Commissioner Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi about a criminal syndicate controlling law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and even elements of the judiciary.
The allegations are serious. If proven, they suggest the very institutions meant to prosecute corruption have been compromised. The commission received an interim report in December 2025. It is too early to assess its impact, but the pattern South Africans have learned to expect weighs heavily.
Will this commission be different? Or will it become another expensive exercise that exposes wrongdoing without securing convictions?
The commission’s cost has not yet been disclosed. Given the complexity of the investigation and the security concerns around witnesses, expect the final bill to run into hundreds of millions of rand.
The Accountability Gap
The disconnect between commission findings and criminal prosecutions points to systemic failure. Commissions expose corruption. They name perpetrators. They document evidence. But they cannot prosecute.
That responsibility falls to the National Prosecuting Authority. The NPA faces capacity constraints, congested court rolls, and the challenge of building cases from commission evidence that was not gathered according to criminal trial standards. Evidence presented to a commission must meet a different burden of proof than evidence presented in court.
But capacity and legal technicalities do not fully explain the gap. Political will matters. When the Nugent Commission recommended Moyane be fired, he was fired within weeks. When the Zondo Commission implicated over 1,400 people, less than 6% face charges three years later.
The question South Africans must ask is not whether commissions work. The question is whether those with the power to act on commission findings want them to work.
The Cost of Impunity
The financial cost of commissions is measurable. R1 billion for Zondo. R140 million for Seriti. R54.5 million for the PIC inquiry. R8.8 million for Nugent. These numbers add up.
But the real cost is harder to quantify. Each commission that fails to produce prosecutions erodes public trust. Each implicated individual who walks free sends a message that corruption carries no consequences. Each billion rand investigation that ends in nothing teaches South Africans that the system protects the powerful.
Foreign investors watch too. They see the evidence of corruption. They see the lack of accountability. They adjust their risk assessments accordingly.
The opportunity cost is perhaps the heaviest burden. R1 billion could have funded new schools, clinics, or infrastructure. Instead, it funded a process that has so far yielded minimal criminal accountability.
What Happens Next?
South Africa stands at a crossroads. The Zondo Commission produced the most comprehensive documentation of state capture ever compiled. The evidence exists. The recommendations are clear. The question is whether the country has the political will to act on them.
The Madlanga Commission could reveal even more disturbing truths about criminal infiltration of law enforcement. But revelations without consequences mean nothing.
If South Africa continues establishing commissions that expose corruption without securing convictions, the commission model itself will become discredited. The public will lose faith not just in individual inquiries but in the entire accountability process.
The pattern must break. Either commissions must be followed by sustained prosecutorial action or South Africa must find a different mechanism for holding the powerful accountable. The current system of expensive investigations followed by minimal prosecutions serves no one except those who benefit from impunity.
Commissions of inquiry were meant to restore public confidence. Instead, they risk becoming monuments to the gap between what South Africa knows about corruption and what it is willing to do about it.
The evidence is there. The findings are documented. The question that remains is the simplest and most difficult of all: when will justice be served?